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ne of the biggest problems in
banking today is the large and
ever-increasing population of the
unbanked – those who are not gaining the
beneﬁts of the regulated banking system
and must rely on high-cost fringe lenders
to do simple transactions like cash their
paychecks. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau have listed this problem
as a top agenda item.1 After decades of
unsuccessful regulatory proposals, the
solution may ﬁnally be at hand.
On January 27, 2014, the Ofﬁce of the
Inspector General of the U.S. Postal Service
(USPS) released a white paper that proposed
that the USPS consider offering ﬁnancial
services to the underbanked.2 Senator
Elizabeth Warren has also publicly expressed
support for the idea.3

The proposal was immediately criticized
by the banking industry as “the worst
idea since the Edsel.”4 The main stated
concern is that the Post Ofﬁce lacks the
institutional capacity to provide ﬁnancial
services.5 But anticompetitive concerns
– namely that a large, well-funded
competitor will cut into banks’ business –
likely play a role too, as they did in 2005
when Walmart attempted to obtain a
banking charter.6
As I have written previously,7
and banking-industry concerns
notwithstanding, the USPS is in a unique
position to provide much-needed ﬁnancial
services for the large population of
unbanked or underbanked Americans.8
First, the Post Ofﬁce can offer credit
at lower rates than fringe lenders by
taking advantage of economies of scale
as well as its position in the federal
bureaucracy. Second, it already has branches
in many low-income neighborhoods that
have been long deserted by commercial
banks. And third, people at every level of
society, including the unbanked, have a
level of familiarity and comfort with the

Editor’s Note: This piece was reprinted with permission from the Harvard Law Review Forum.
The article’s citation is 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 165 (2014). Baradaran also has a book titled How
the Other Half Banks by Harvard University Press that will be published this fall.
www.law.uga.edu

Post Ofﬁce that they do not have with more
formal banking institutions.
This essay moves one step further by
demonstrating why government support
and even subsidies to enable postal banking
in the United States are appropriate and
justiﬁable.
First, banking-related subsidies
are grounded in historical practice, as
demonstrated by government support
for credit unions, savings and loans, and
student loan associations. Postal banking
derives from these longstanding practices,
but broadens the scope to include the poor,
not just the middle class.
Further, state support of banking
throughout U.S. history has operated much
like a social contract: the state supports the
banking system in a variety of ways and, in
return, banks serve as credit intermediaries,
providing the populace with access to loans
and ﬁnancial services. Thus, subsidies for
banking have been justiﬁed because they
provide a beneﬁt to all citizens.
Mainstream banks have met part of
their obligation, but a large portion of the
population, namely the poor, has been left
out. It is time, then, for the government
itself to meet the demand for credit.
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I. How the Post Ofﬁce
Can Bank the Unbanked

38%

The unbanked and underbanked
population in the United States is
signiﬁcant, with far-reaching consequences.
Approximately 88 million people in
the United States, 38% of the population,
are unbanked or underbanked.9 Indeed,
nearly half of U.S. adults could not access
$2000 within thirty days to respond to an
emergency.10
To meet their short-term credit needs,
these individuals and families must rely
on payday lenders, check cashers, or other
fringe banking institutions. These lenders
are often usurious, sometimes predatory,
and almost always much worse for lowincome individuals than the services offered
by traditional banks to their customers.
For instance, the average annual income
for an unbanked family is $25,500, and
about 10% of that income, or $2412,
goes to the fees and interest paid to access
credit or other ﬁnancial services – services
that those with bank accounts often get
for free.11 Cutting down these payments
would help many avoid bankruptcy; those
who ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2012 were,
on average, just $26 per month short of
meeting their expenses.12
The Post Ofﬁce can address
this problem and lower these
credit costs for the three
reasons outlined below.

USPS white paper claims that the Post Ofﬁce
could offer a $375 loan with interest and
fees totaling $48, as opposed to $520 for the
average payday loan for that amount.14
This discount is possible because the
Post Ofﬁce is able to operate with less
overhead than fringe lenders and because
it can beneﬁt from economies of scale. It
could reduce costs by using its existing
infrastructure and clientele.
In addition, its collection costs could
be lower because it may be able to enlist
the help of the IRS and other federal
enforcement mechanisms that can easily
garnish wages or tax returns.15
It can also offer smaller individual loans
that yield smaller margins by doing so at a
greater volume.
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B. PROXIMITY

There are economic justiﬁcations
for charging higher interest rates to those
with lower incomes. The poor pay more for
credit than the middle class because they
are more likely to default and lenders must
be compensated for assuming this risk. In
other words, those least likely to be able to
pay their debts are charged a premium for
that inability.
But even assuming that the risk presented
by low-income borrowers is accurately
priced by fringe lenders (a proposition
that the available data does not strongly
support13), the Post Ofﬁce can still provide
these services at a lower price. In fact, the

Moreover, the Post Ofﬁce is uniquely
positioned to solve the problems of credit
access for the poor because Post Ofﬁces
remain in the low-income neighborhoods
that banks abandoned.
The banking industry underwent a
signiﬁcant transformation during the 1970s
and 1980s as mainstream commercial banks
faced increased competition from other
ﬁnancial institutions. This market pressure on
traditional banks was a result of technological
advances coupled with swift deregulation.16
Forced to compete, banks shed their
less-proﬁtable products, namely small
loans to lower income communities. The

12

Advocate 2015

"QQSPYJNBUFMZ
million people in the United
4UBUFT PGUIFQPQVMBUJPO 
are unbanked or underbanked.
poor may need banks, but the reverse is
certainly not true.
Many mainstream banks hold the
position that “[p]roviding ﬁnancial
services to the poor is fundamentally
unproﬁtable.”17 Assuming the same risk of
default, it costs a bank roughly the same
amount of overhead and transactional
costs to lend $1000 as it does $100,000,
with the latter yielding a greater proﬁt.
In pursuit of higher proﬁt margins,
banks closed branches in lower-income
neighborhoods en masse. And once they
did, the fringe lenders moved in.18 Thus,
a signiﬁcant barrier to banking the poor
is the dearth of bank branches in lowincome areas.
Chartered banks are regulated by state
and federal laws and therefore have usury
limits, or interest rate caps, on the loans
they can offer. Fringe lenders do not. Once
the regulated banks left these communities,
so did reasonable interest rates.
For decades, banking regulators and
advocacy groups have been trying to
lure mainstream banks back to these
neighborhoods through legislation and
agency action, using both carrots and
sticks.19 These efforts have not succeeded
and have faced signiﬁcant industry
opposition.
Post Ofﬁces, on the other hand, have
always been a part of nearly every zip
code across the country. This fact, above
others, makes postal banking a uniquely
appealing idea.
www.law.uga.edu
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The third major advantage of postal
banking is that Post Ofﬁces provide a
more welcoming atmosphere, overcoming
many cultural barriers that lead the
poor to avoid banks. Analyzing the
demographics of the unbanked while
controlling for income reveals that there
are racial and cultural barriers that keep
many people away from banking.
For example, more blacks and Hispanics
are unbanked than whites, as are more
women than men.20 Many of the unbanked
report being more comfortable in fringe
banking institutions than in banks.21
Payday lenders deal behind a facade
of informality. They operate in cash, in
the direct vicinity of their customers, and
usually in their language. This business
model seems to be in direct contrast to
banks with their rigid hours, requirements,
and procedures.
While the Post Ofﬁce will not be
able to overcome all of these barriers, its
branches are more accessible places than
commercial banks because of their presence
in low-income neighborhoods and their
informality. The Post Ofﬁce is not an
intimidating institution; the poor know its
location and understand its processes.
For all the Post Ofﬁce’s ﬂaws, rich and
poor across the country are familiar with
its locations and often even the postal
employees behind the counter.22
To be sure, there are private institutions
with similar capacities, but they are not
likely to provide a solution anytime soon.
Walmart, for example, recently started
offering simple ﬁnancial services, such
as check cashing and prepaid cards, at a
discount to its customers.23 However, the
retail giant, having been deﬁnitively denied
a banking charter, cannot offer credit – the
most-needed ﬁnancial product.
The postal system, in contrast, is
well positioned to overcome most
of the hurdles to banking the poor
due to its ability to take advantage of
economies of scale, its presence in poorer
neighborhoods, and its long-standing
relationship of trust with all of America’s
communities.
www.law.uga.edu

II. Why the U.S.
Government Should
Support Postal Banking
The opposition to postal banking is
likely to center on the idea that this service
functions as an inappropriate federal
subsidy to the poor. But any
direct or indirect subsidy of
banking access for the poor is
supported both historically and
theoretically.
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Postal banking is not unprecedented in
the United States. In 1873, President Grant’s
Postmaster General proposed a governmentsponsored savings program, modeled after
one started in Britain.24
In 1910, President Taft responded to
growing populist proposals to establish
a government-backed savings system for
recent immigrants and the poor.25 The Postal
Savings System was created to enable the
poor to save money with the assurance of
a government guarantee that their deposits
were protected.26
This program was created and geared to
recent immigrants and the unbanked poor,
and was wildly successful: at the end of the
ﬁrst year, there was a total of $20 million in
deposits, “most of which had been coaxed
out of hiding.”27
The director of postal savings, Carter
Keene, declared in 1913 that the postal
savings system was not meant to yield a
proﬁt: “Its aim is inﬁnitely higher and more
important. Its mission is to encourage thrift
and economy among all classes of citizens. It
stands for good citizenship and tends to
diminish crime. It places savings facilities
at the very doors of those living in remote
sections, and it also affords opportunity for
safeguarding the savings of thousands who
have absolute conﬁdence in the Government
and will trust no other institution.”28
Throughout American history, there
have been various state-supported
attempts to meet the banking needs of the
poor – both for depositary services and
credit. Policymakers have largely recognized
that access to ﬁnancial services and credit

is a signiﬁcant step toward individual
economic advancement.29
Credit gives the poor the ability to
absorb ﬁnancial reversals, the means to
start or expand a small business, and the
capacity to build a ﬁnancial cushion to
withstand individual economic shocks.30
Several studies have demonstrated
that when poor communities are
provided access to credit and
other banking services, they
thrive economically.31 Studies also
show that small-scale credit leads
to increased income and savings
among borrowers.32 The converse is
also true: barriers to credit signiﬁcantly
hamper the economic development of
poor communities and individuals.33
For most of this country’s history,
the credit needs of the poor and middle
class were met by banking institutions
speciﬁcally created and designed to
appeal to them, such as credit unions,
savings and loan associations, and the
smaller Morris Banks.34
Credit unions were a populist
innovation designed as cooperatives not
only to provide access to credit, but also
to provide federal insurance to protect
investments.35
Savings and loan associations (S&Ls)
were formally created in the 1930s
to offer affordable mortgage loans to
lower- and middle-class people.36 These
institutions began as cooperatives with
shared ownership, a structure that led to
the forbearance of proﬁt.37
In contrast, the little-known Morris
Bank was a for-proﬁt banking venture
aimed at the “democratization of credit,”
created to give the poor increased access
to credit.38
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Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks
were alternatives to mainstream banks, but
they were all supported and subsidized by
the federal government through targeted
regulation and deposit insurance protection.39
As described above, banking
forms homogenized in the
1970s and 1980s, leaving
little room for variation in
institutional or regulatory
design.40 Eventually, each
of these institutions drifted
from their initial mission of
serving the poor and began to look
more like commercial banks, even competing
with them for ever-shrinking proﬁt margins.
The result now is essentially two forms
of banks: regulated mainstream banks that
seek maximum proﬁt for their shareholders
by serving the needs of the wealthy and
middle class, and unregulated fringe
banks that seek maximum proﬁts for their
shareholders by serving the banking and
credit needs of the poor.
What is missing from the American
banking landscape for the ﬁrst time in almost
a century is a government-sponsored bank
whose main purpose is to meet the needs of
the poor. Rather than relegating the poor to
fringe banks, policymakers should carve out a
place for banks that serve the poor and enable
them to survive and thrive. This charge has
deep historic roots in U.S. banking.
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As I have written elsewhere, the state
has always had a social contract with its
banks, which at times has been explicit and
at times implicit, but always with the same
understanding: the state provides banks
with public trust (through insurance and
implicit bailouts) – trust that is necessary
for their survival; in return, banks provide
much-needed credit, savings, and ﬁnancial
intermediation services for individuals and
institutions.41

Income disparity is greater in the
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Currently, a few large and powerful
banks, who continue to beneﬁt from
trillions of dollars of federal government
subsidies, control the majority of assets
in the banking sector and also the
majority of credit.42 And this credit is
not reaching the poor.43
If the banking system is to be
supported by the government, the
entire citizenry should be able to
access its services.
Insofar as a heavily subsidized
banking sector is the status quo and
that sector does not beneﬁt the entire
population, a government subsidy to
lend to the poor simply provides another
mechanism for reaching the same policy
goals. And if the banks beneﬁting from
subsidies are no longer taking up the task,
the government should do so directly.
The federal government subsidizes
other credit products to achieve
important policy goals but, thus far,
these programs have been primarily
designed for the middle class.
The government sponsors and
underwrites private student loans. A
student borrower who qualiﬁes for such
a loan receives credit at a below-market
interest rate and remains indebted to
the government until the loan is paid
off. The government supports such loans
because they facilitate an important public
objective – educating the population.
The government also creates and
supports a secondary mortgage market to
promote the policy goal of increased
home ownership.44
Enabling the poor to escape
poverty is no less important a public
concern. Offering good credit to the
poor would enable economic mobility,
which has lagged signiﬁcantly in the
United States in recent years, and solve a
variety of other public problems linked to
entrenched poverty.
Given the recent debacles of federally
funded institutions such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac,45 the federal
government would have to be cautious
in taking on risks associated with
lending to the poor. However, these
services do not entail the scope of risks

associated with home mortgages. Cashing
a check for a small fee or offering a payday
loan often involve much less risk.
After the recent global ﬁnancial crisis,
any call for easing credit of any kind is
suspect because of the widespread, yet
inaccurate, belief that the ﬁnancial crisis
was precipitated by an overabundance
of consumer access to mortgage
credit.46 Therefore, the case for increasing
consumer access to credit is a politically
difﬁcult one to make.
However, the status quo is not sustainable
as onerous interest rates make it much more
difﬁcult for individuals to escape poverty
and growing income disparity has various
negative economic effects.47
Bank credit not only allows the economy
to grow wealth, but also allows individual
families to do so. Any difference in credit
access undermines the justiﬁcations for state
support of banks.
Insofar as economic mobility is a social
good, and credit is a necessary tool for
economic advancement, government
policies should be aimed at enhancing access
for all individuals and communities. Access
to safe credit is crucial in allowing the poor
to escape poverty.
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One thing that could undermine
postal banking would be inappropriate
proﬁt-seeking. Attempts to regulate the
private market have demonstrated that
institutions with an eye toward proﬁt
maximization have been unable or
unwilling to meet the credit needs
of the poor.48
In February 2008, the FDIC
began the “Small-Dollar Loan
Pilot Program,” a two-year campaign to
enlist mainstream banks to lend to the
poor.49 The project was described as “a
case study designed to illustrate how banks
can proﬁtably offer affordable small-dollar
loans as an alternative to high-cost credit
products, such as payday loans and feebased overdraft protection.”50
The program, which enlisted twentyeight volunteer banks, was a failure. A
congressional review committee noted that
banks were charging the maximum rates
www.law.uga.edu

allowed in the program –
36% APR and 20% charges on
cashed checks, which were not
much better than payday loans.51
The main reason this program
failed is that mainstream banks do
not have the incentive to sacriﬁce proﬁts
to meet the needs of the poor. They
must survive and stay proﬁtable in a
competitive banking market, and when
they offer low-cost loans to the poor, they
lose their competitive position and hurt
their bottom line.
Policymakers misunderstand the
nature of mainstream banks if they are
relying on them to adequately meet the
needs of the poor.
At best, banks can be incentivized to
meet the poor’s banking needs merely
to appease regulators. The products the
banks offer are not innovative fruits of
market research about what the poor
really need – the banks offer the bare
minimum so that they can maintain
proﬁtability while fulﬁlling a regulatory
mandate.52 Forcing banks, whose
purpose is to maximize proﬁts, to make
loans to the poor will inevitably lead
to inadequate loans and disgruntled
bankers.
Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris
Banks, in contrast, were able to
successfully reach the poor because doing
so was their primary goal. And so it must
be with the Post Ofﬁce.
There is a troubling statement in the
USPS white paper on this front. The
paper states that providing these services
“could result in major new revenue for
the Postal Service.”53 This motive cannot
be the driving force behind this endeavor
or else, as the pilot program example
proved, it is unlikely to reach the goal
of offering the poor the credit that they
need.
This is not to say that the venture will
not be a major new revenue source for
the USPS. And the competition provided
by the government entering this sector
could possibly drive prices down in the
private fringe banking sector to more
accurately reﬂect the risks of lending to
the poor.
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III. Conclusion
Income disparity is greater in
the United States than ever before,
and the banking industry is more
heavily subsidized than at any
point in U.S. history. The result
should be an increase in credit
to those who most need it.
Unfortunately, the reverse is
happening – the poor have been
excluded from the credit ﬂowing from
the subsidized banking sector. Any
efforts at forcing that sector to
provide credit to the poor have
failed because they are institutionally
designed to maximize proﬁts and
lending to the poor is not conducive
to proﬁt maximization.

It is time for the government to step in
and solve this market mismatch. The USPS
is far from the most efﬁcient or successful
government agency, but it may just be
the perfect institution to accomplish the
monumental undertaking of providing the
credit the poor need to escape poverty.
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